DIGEST/ ANDRINO/ PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. CITI APPLIANCE M.C. CORPORATION, RESPONDENT./ 2019

 

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. CITI APPLIANCE M.C. CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Citi filed a complaint for forcible entry against PLDT, alleging that the latter’s underground telephone lines, cables, and manholes encroached on its property. PLDT argued that Citi’s action had already prescribed, since the 1-year prescriptive period within which to file an action for forcible entry through stealth is counted from the discovery of the alleged unlawful entry (which PLDT alleged to be sometime in April-May 2003), not the last demand to vacate. The MTCC, RTC, and CA ruled in favor of Citi, holding that its complaint was timely filed since the 1-year prescriptive period should be counted from the last demand to vacate (Citi made a final demand on May 28, 2004 then filed its complaint on October 1, 2004), based on jurisprudence. The SC reversed the CA, holding that the 1-year time bar (for an action for forcible entry through stealth) is reckoned from the date of discovery of the encroachment. Citi’s own complaint shows that it discovered the underground cables and lines in April 2003. Hence, its action had already prescribed and the MTCC no longer had jurisdiction over its forcible entry complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1-year prescriptive period of action for forcible entry through stealth should be reckoned from the time the unlawful entry is discovered or from the last demand to vacate.

Ruling:

A judicious review of these cases and jurisprudence, both old and recent, reveals that the one-year time bar in forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of discovery of the encroachment, not from the date of the last demand to vacate.

In the 1965 case of Ganancial,^[93] Hilario Ganancial (Ganancial) filed a complaint for forcible entry against Leonardo Atillo (Atillo) on April 24, 1961. He alleged that on February 6, 1960, Atillo occupied his property through strategy, stealth, and force. When the Municipal Court's jurisdiction was questioned, Ganancial argued that the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from February 3, 1961, the date when he sent the notice to vacate.

In resolving the case, this Court ruled that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment suit because the reckoning point of the prescriptive period is the date of dispossession, not the date of demand to vacate. In so ruling:

The stand of plaintiffs-appellants that the commencement of the period, within which to bring the action in the municipal court, should be from the date of demand to vacate the premises, is untenable under the facts obtaining in the case at bar. It is clear from the pleadings that plaintiffs knew of the dispossession or illegal entry since February 6, 1960, and they offered no alibi for not knowing it.... Having knowledge of this fact, it stands to reason that the commencement of the one (1) year period should be, as it is, the very date of illegal entry.^[94]

The subsequent case of Elane is not as straightforward. This case involves an action for forcible entry through stealth. In ruling that prescriptive period had not lapsed when the complaint was filed, this stated:

Where forcible entry was thus made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time private respondent demanded that the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former learned thereof. The records reflect that such discovery and prohibition took place on February 15, 1980, reiterated thereafter in the demand letter of March 1, 1980, both to no avail. Consequently, the one­-year period had not expired on March 6, 1980 when private respondent filed the ejectment suit with the then City Court of Olongapo City.^[95] (Emphasis supplied)

This Court seemed to have been indecisive on the basis of its ruling Elane. This was because whether the reckoning period was from the date discovery (i.e. February 15, 1980) or the date of demand to vacate (i.e. March 1, 1980), the suit filed on March 6, 1980 was well within the prescriptive period. Citing Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes,^[96] this Court stated the reckoning period should be "from the time private respondent that the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former thereof."^[97] This pronouncement seemingly caused this confusion.

A careful reading of Vda. de Prieto will explain the inconsistency, this 1965 case, Consuelo Vda. de Prieto filed a case for "illegal detainer"^[98] against Paciencia Reyes (Reyes). She alleged that Reyes built a house on her lot through stealth, strategy, and misrepresentation. Upon discovering the encroachment in January 1952, she sent Reyes letters to vacate the following month. But Reyes averred that there was no jurisdiction over the case because she had been in possession of the lot since December 1948; hence, when the action was filed in April 1952, the action had already prescribed.^[99]

In ruling that there was jurisdiction, this Court held that because the intrusion was done through stealth, the action's prescriptive period could not be counted from the date of encroachment in 1948. The ratio of the decision reads:

It is insisted now that both trial courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the illegal detainer suit, because [Reyes] had been in possession since December, 1948, and the action was started only in 1952; and that it was an error to consider that the year for the summary action should be counted only from the time the owner learned of [Reyes'] encroachment.

The contention is unmeritorious. There is a natural difference between an entry secured by force or violence and one obtained by stealth, as in the case before us. The owner or possessor of the land could not be expected to enforce his right to its possession against the illegal occupant and sue the latter before learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to deprive the lawful possessor of the benefit of the summary action, under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder manages to conceal the trespass for more than a year would be to reward clandestine usurpations even if they are unlawful.^[100] (Emphasis supplied)

In concluding the Decision, however, this Court erroneously remarked that since there can be "possession by tolerance," the prescriptive period must be counted from the time that there was a demand to vacate. At the very end of the Decision, it noted:

Besides, since there can be possession by tolerance, this Court has repeatedly held that possession or detainer becomes illegal only from the time that there is a demand to vacate. Hence, the year for bringing the action for illegal detainer should be counted only from such demand. Since in the case before us the first demand to vacate was made in February of 1952 and the complaint was filed in April of the same year, the plea of lack of jurisdiction has nothing to support it.^[101] (Citation omitted)

The carelessness of injecting the concept of "possession by tolerance" led this Court in Vda. de Prieto to erroneously mix up rules on forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

The discussion on possession by tolerance, which is only applicable in unlawful detainer cases, was a patent error. In cases of forcible entry through stealth, there can be no possession by tolerance precisely because the owner could not have known beforehand that someone else possessed his or her property; thus, he or she could not have tolerated the possession of the intruder. As held in Canlas v. Tubil,^[102] possession by tolerance falls under unlawful detainer because it is a possession that was initially lawful but later became unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with the owner's demand to vacate. Thus, in Vda. de Prieto, the reckoning point for actions for forcible entry through stealth should be the date of the discovery of the entry, not the date of demand to vacate.

Unfortunately, this error was replicated in subsequent cases, including Philippine Overseas Telecommunications. Nonetheless, subsequent cases have already clarified the rules on forcible entry.

In Spouses Barnachea v. Court of Appeals,^[103] this Court ruled that in forcible entry suits, "the law does not require a previous demand ... to vacate the premises, and ... the action can be brought only within one-year from the date the defendant actually and illegally entered the property."^[104]

In Dela Cruz,^[105] this Court held that the prescriptive period in a forcible entry case is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land-except when this entry was made through stealth, in which case, the period is reckoned from the time of discovery.^[106] Similarly, in Diaz v. Spouses Punzalan:^[107]

[I]n an action for forcible entry, the following requisites are essential for the MTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case: (1) the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property; (2) the plaintiff was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (3) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one (1)-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical possession of the property. It is not necessary, however, for the complaint to expressly use the exact language of the law. For as long as it is shown that the dispossession took place under said conditions, it is considered as sufficient compliance with the requirements.^[108] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The one-year prescriptive period is a jurisdictional requirement^[109] consistent with the summary nature of ejectment suits.^[110] In Sarona v. Villegas,^[111] this Court made a distinction between unlawful detainer and forcible entry in discussing the implication of the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry cases. It stated:

First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress - in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court - upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Citation omitted)

Here, a review of respondent's own narration of facts reveals that it discovered the underground cables and lines in April 2003 when it applied for exemption from the parking slot requirement with the Cebu City Zoning Board. Respondent's complaint is telling:

Causes of Action

....

10. In its honest effort to remedy the situation and in order to immediately start its construction of the building without removing Defendant's underground telephone lines, cables and manholes, the Plaintiff had applied for exemption of the required number of parking slots but was denied[.]

Counting from this date, the one-year prescriptive period to file the forcible entry suit had already lapsed sometime in April 2004. Thus, by the time the complaint for forcible entry was filed on October 1, 2004, the period had already prescribed. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, therefore, no longer had jurisdiction to resolve the case.