EGUIA/ TERESITA BONGATO VS. SPOUSES SEVERO A. MALVAR AND TRINIDAD MALVAR/2002

 TERESITA BONGATO, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES SEVERO A. MALVAR AND TRINIDAD MALVAR, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002 

FACTS:

    Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land  belonging to the said spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials. The petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied; it being proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of hearing. Petitioner filed an answer which the MTCC disregarded, the same having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Later, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which the MTCC denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure.

    Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question, and to pay rentals, attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

    Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration 'only insofar as to determine the location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting.’ In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution would be issued.

    The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by private respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City.

    Petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994 deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to move the deadline as the engineer concerned could not conduct his survey during the Holy Week, he being a lay minister and parish council member. Respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for disposal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one-year period from date of alleged entry.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading.

RULING:

1.

    Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for petitioner’s contention that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case.

   First, respondents allege that the subject house was built by petitioner on subject parcel of land. This allegation is belied by the sketch plan submitted by the engineer. To recall, the RTC had required petitioner to submit a relocation survey of Lot to determine the location of the house and to ascertain if it was the same house involved in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting. However, because of the Holy Week, petitioner failed to submit the relocation survey within the period provided by the RTC. In the said sketch plan that was offered in evidence as Exhibit "5" in the anti-squatting case, Engineer certified that "the hut of Teresita Bongato is not within said lot as shown in this plan as relocated by the undersigned."

    Second, according to the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659, petitioner’s house is actually located on another lot in the name of Severo Malvar and superseded in the name of Butuan Land Developers Group Inc. 

    Third, petitioner’s house had actually been in existence prior to the alleged date of illegal entry. 

    That the house of petitioner had been constructed by her father and that she had merely continued to reside therein was upheld by the Decision of the criminal case.

    Fourth, Respondent Severo Malvar admitted in Criminal Case No. 4659 that he had knowledge of petitioner’s house since January 1987. We quote from his testimony:

    It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

    On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

2.

    Petitioner argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. We agree.

The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases." The speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and the Rule should equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession of the premises is already illegal from the start. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. However, as forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override substantial justice.

Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings:

"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;

x x x           x x x          x x x"

Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed.

In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable.

Finally, the MTCC should have taken into account petitioner’s Answer, in which she averred that she had been "in constant occupation on said land in question since birth up to the present, being an heir of the late Emiliana Eva-Bongato, who inherited said property from her father Raymundo Eva with considerable improvements thereon." It should have heard and received the evidence adduced by the parties for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter. And after such hearing, it could have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this way, the long, drawn out proceedings that took place in this case could have been avoided.

The Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for forcible entry is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.