DIGEST/ PAULA BIANCA B. EGUIA/ PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET, INC./1999

 PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS 

AND WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET INC.

G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999 

FACTS:

    Petitioner Progressive Development Corp. leased to respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building for a period of nine (9) years and three (3) months with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00. Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner.   

    The non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority granted of the lease agreement, Progressive Development Corp .repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned by Westin Seafood Market, Inc., and scheduled public auction for the sale of the movables.

  Private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary  injunction. At the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a writ preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties arrived at an agreement among which is th responded depositing the amount of the back rentals with the bank. 

  Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the designated bank the amount representing its back rentals.  Instead, with the forcible entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent instituted another action for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping.  The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. 

ISSUE:

    Whether or not the action for damages filed by respondent in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of an action for forcible entry and damages with the same parties before the Metropolitan Trial Court.

RULING:

    Yes. The action for damages before the Regional Trial Court should be dismissed. 

    Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together with damages and costs. All cases for forcible entry or unlawful  detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom.   Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.

    Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for dismissal of an action.  Res adjudicata requires that there must be between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements:  (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.

    It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.   Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a right of another.

    These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs arise. The restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for   damages  with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by petitioner into the leased premises.

    The two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages - moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory - constitutes splitting a single cause of action.   Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.

    The forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose:  (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises  to  the  lessee;   (b)  the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and costs of suit.

    On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by petitioner.  Since actual and  compensatory damages were already prayed  for  in  the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata. The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC.

    In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the physical possession of the real property.  The question of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so much  so that the amount thereof does not affect the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  In other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of possession, but only to one action.   For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and the other, for the recovery of damages.  That would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.

    What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action?   Since the rule is that all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without saying  that  those  not  therein included cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever. If a suit is brought for a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical with the first or different grounds for relief are set for the second suit.  This principle not only embraces what was actually determined, but also extends to every matter which the parties might have litigated in the case.

    In Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission we ruled that "There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another.  The principle applies x x x with respect to suits filed in the courts x x x in connection with litigations commenced in the court x x x in anticipation of an unfavorable x x x ruling and a favorable case where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction."

    This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that there is forum shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances. 

    The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum shopping.   When petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum shopping it pointed out the absence of the required certification.  The  amended complaint, as well as the second and third amended complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no other action pending between the parties involving the same causes of action although there was actually a forcible entry case pending before the MTC of Quezon City.   By its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum shopping.  While private respondent conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the second case.