DIGEST/ PAULA BIANCA B. EGUIA/ CELERNA CALAYAG ET AL. VS. SULPICIO LINES INC./2016

 CELERNA CALAYAG ET AL. VS. SULPICIO LINES INC. 

G.R. No. 221864, September 14, 2016

FACTS:

    The subject petition stems from the 71 consolidated cases for civil damages filed by Celerna Calayag, et al. (petitioners), the survivors of the victims of the ill-fated M/V Princess of the Stars, which sank on June 20, 2008, against Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio) and the owners, officers, ship captain, and ship master thereof.

    Controversy arose when Sulpicio and its co-defendants suspected that Judge Villanueva was exhibiting bias in favor of petitioners. Firm in their belief, Sulpicio and its co-defendants filed separate motions for his inhibition on the basis of the following specific charges

    

(1) allowed witness to testify on actual damages even if there was no claim for such in the Complaint filed by [petitioners];

(2)  allowed the presentation of a mere photocopy of the circular relating to the PISA minutes meeting of the shipowners despite the timely objection made by [Sulpicio] in view of the requirement under the Judicial Affidavit Rule that the originals of the document must be attached to the affidavit. Worse, [Judge Villanueva] declared that the "Best Evidence Rule" has no application before his Court;

(3) committed misconduct when admitted an opinion testimony from an ordinary witness, wherein [Sulpicio] objected to the questions contained in the judicial affidavit of witness for being speculative as it intended to pass off the opinion of the said witness on the number of years her alleged missing relative would have lived without any concrete or factual basis for the same;

(4) manifest partiality towards [petitioners] by actively participating during the cross-examination in the form of questioning to test the credibility of the witness of [petitioners] and doing the objections for the latter. Worse, in disallowing the cross-examination to test the credibility of the witness, [Judge Villanueva] is even quoted by [Sulpicio] to have said: "x x x don't use that test of credibility here in Branch 49;"

(5) prejudged the case by referring to [Sulpicio's] alleged "notoriety," having in mind the past maritime mishaps involving the former; and 

(6) showed hostility towards [Sulpicio's] counsel when he unfairly referred Atty. Dante Vargas, as a mere "saling-pusa."

    Petitioners opposed the motion.

    Judge Villanueva denied the said motions for inhibition for the reasons 1) that the perceived errors committed by him and his use of the words "saling pusa" and/or "kibitzer" against the counsel of Sulpicio's co-defendants were totally taken out of context; and 2) that his rulings were simply meant to prevent delay.

 Sulpicio sought reconsideration, but its motion was denied. Sulpicio initiated certiorari proceedings before the CA, alleging that Judge Villanueva committed grave abuse of discretion when he refused to recuse himself from the case. While the petition before the CA was pending, Judge Villanueva handed down his Decision, ordering Sulpicio and its co-defendants, jointly and severally, to pay damages to petitioners. Aggrieved, Sulpicio filed its notice of appeal.

    Three days following the promulgation of the RTC decision, the, CA promulgated its assailed decision granting the petition for certiorari and directing Judge Villanueva to recuse himself from hearing the civil cases for damages. In its decision, the CA faulted the presiding judge for allowing an ordinary witness to provide testimony of his own opinion in violation of the Judicial Affidavit Rule. The CA opined that this, coupled with his remarks in open court, cast doubt on his impartiality.

    Hoping that the CA would reverse itself, petitioners filed their Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation. On its part, Sulpicio sought to have Judge Villanueva cited for contempt for proceeding with hearing the main case and deciding the same while certiorari proceedings in the CA were ongoing. Sulpicio likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the execution of the RTC Decision.

 The CA issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration for being moot and academic. The appellate court explained that the decision on the merits of the main case by Judge Villanueva rendered the inhibition proceedings moot and academic.

    The CA also saw no reason to cite Judge Villanueva in contempt because he had no reason not to proceed with the case and decide it on its merits while certiorari proceedings were pending. It explained that the remedy of Sulpicio was to appeal the judgment on the merits and incorporate therein the improprieties committed by Judge Villanueva during the trial.leslaw

    As for the prayer for TRO and/or injunction, the CA was of the view that a TRO or injunction was no longer necessary as it had already ordered Judge Villanueva to cease from further performing acts relative to the civil cases for damages. Not in conformity, petitioners questioned the CA decision and resolution in this petition.

ISSUE:

    Whether there were sufficient grounds for the CA to order the inhibition of Judge Villanueva from the civil cases filed against Sulpicio.

RULING:

    Yes. 

  Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court encapsulates the rules on the disqualification and the inhibition of judicial officials. 

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

    From the above, the rule on disqualification and inhibition essentially involves two aspects, one being compulsory disqualification and the other being voluntary inhibition.

    Compulsory disqualification assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the reasons stated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules. It has been said that the rationale for the rule on the compulsory disqualification of a judge or judicial officer is predicated on the long-standing precept that no judge should preside in a case in which he or she is not wholly independent, disinterested or impartial. Judges should not handle cases in which they might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is aimed at preserving at all times the people's faith and confidence in our courts, which are essential to the effective administration of justice.

    On the other hand, the aspect of voluntary inhibition, as stated in the second paragraph, involves the use of discretion. Undoubtedly, it partakes of voluntariness and is a matter of conscience that is addressed primarily to the judge's sense of fairness and justice.

    This discretion is an acknowledgment of the fact that judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the litigants in their courtrooms. The decision on whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.

    To guide the members of the bench, it should be stated that inhibition must be for just and valid causes. Generally, the mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. The disqualification of a judge cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or be predicated on the adverse nature of the judges rulings towards the movant for inhibition. In fact, this Court has, on several instances, ruled that to warrant the judge's inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source. In other words, a judge must inhibit only if it is shown that a judge's evident leaning towards a party would result in a disposition on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participating in the case.

    As with many rules, however, there are exceptions; such as -whenever it is shown that the consistency and regularity with which a judge issued the assailed directives give rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or to a superficial impression of partiality, but to a clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice, a judge may be directed to inhibit himself from presiding over the case.

    Although the opinion of petitioners' witness might tend to prove Sulpicio's overall liability to petitioners for their loss, still, to arrive at such conclusion on the amount of its liability based on the testimony of an ordinary witness smacks of wanton disregard of procedural rules.

    Uncontroverted also is the fact that Judge Villanueva denigrated and belittled the counsel for the co-defendants by calling him a mere "kibitzer" or "saling-pusa." The Court finds that the remark was uncalled for as it publicly humiliated him before everyone present in the courtroom. This open degrading description of the said counsel bares a state of mind of a partial trial judge. By his expression of his regard for a counsel of a litigant, he displayed his predisposition and propensity to partiality.

    Ordinarily, the foregoing, even taken together, would not constitute a solid ground for the inhibition of a trial judge. His remarks could have been uttered in the excitement of the moment. Such lapses, however, when coupled with his acting on the case after he was ordered by the CA to recuse himself, brought to fore his tendentious mind.

    The most telling manifestation of his partiality was his Order granting petitioners' motion for execution pending appeal. Despite receiving categorical orders from the CA to recuse himself from participating in the subject civil cases, Judge Villanueva acted on petitioners' motion for execution pending appeal and granted it. The records even show that despite being directed to transmit the records of the case for reraffle, Judge Villanueva failed to heed this directive. By his acts and statements, he confirmed his evident predisposition.

    Thus, while petitioners were correct in asserting that Judge Villanueva had yet to receive the CA decision ordering his inhibition when he handed down his decision on the civil cases, he should not have entertained the subsequent motion for execution pending appeal and recused himself from the case as he already received CA Decision and Resolution ordering his inhibition.

    Taking into consideration the actions of Judge Villanueva during the trial and his overzealousness to have his decision executed despite clear directive from the CA, the Court finds that Sulpicio's right to have an impartial judge was clearly violated. Thus, the Court will let stand the ruling of the CA ordering Judge Villanueva to recuse himself from the case.

    Clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion, the Order of Judge Villanueva granting petitioners' motion of execution pending appeal should be annulled. To let it be is to sanction and reward disrespect of a higher tribunal.

    Judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving a democratic way of life, it is essential that judges be above suspicion. It bears stressing that the duty of judges is not only to administer justice but also to conduct themselves in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. This arises from the avowed duty of members of the Bench to promote confidence in judicial system. Occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice, judges must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon them. Hence, any act which would give the appearance of impropriety becomes, of itself, reprehensible.